A research report from Andromeda Computer comparing three payout mechanisms for Trepa, a one-minute forecasting game on Solana where participants submit numerical BTC/USD estimates and are rewarded by proximity to the true outcome: (A) the current median-error cutoff with water-filling, (B) a continuous accuracy-proportional distribution with no cutoff, and (C) a hybrid design keeping the cutoff but adding a consolation floor for losers. Multi-agent equilibrium simulations across 540 configurations show no mechanism is universally optimal — the median cutoff yields higher equilibrium private-signal weight on average (0.375 vs 0.297), the continuous design matches or beats it for low risk-aversion agents, and the cutoff dominates for high risk-aversion agents — while a hybrid with a 0.5F consolation floor outperforms both pure designs in 70% of cases, raising private-signal weight while eliminating total-loss trauma and improving Sybil resistance. Recommends a segmented pool strategy, with open-source simulation code for independent verification.

Analyzes Trepa's high-frequency forecasting contest on Solana and shows its current design (median error cutoff, steep accuracy weights) induces a Keynesian beauty contest equilibrium that underweights private information. Introduces the orthogonal precision multiplier, a mechanism that rewards accurate forecasts decorrelated from the consensus, transforming Trepa into a tunable second-order oracle. Proves equilibrium existence via potential game theory, quantifies information gain through mutual information, and addresses practical vulnerabilities including oracle latency, median instability, and collusion.