A class of automated market maker mechanisms that subsidize trade by penalizing a market maker according to a proper scoring rule. Traders profit by moving prices closer to their beliefs, ensuring the market maker absorbs losses in exchange for eliciting honest probability estimates. LMSR is the most widely used instance.
Cluster: Mechanism Design
A class of automated market maker mechanisms that subsidize trade by penalizing a market maker according to a proper scoring rule. Traders profit by moving prices closer to their beliefs, ensuring the market maker absorbs losses in exchange for eliciting honest probability estimates. LMSR is the most widely used instance.
Referenced in 2 articles
Uses the March 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis to argue that binary order-book prediction markets hit an architectural ceiling when pricing granular, multi-outcome risk. Compares how traditional options solve this for tradable assets, then explains how automated market scoring rules (LMSR/CLMSR) offer protocol-native liquidity, coherent pricing, and capital efficiency for events without underlying assets. Walks through a concrete WTI crude oil scenario showing how scoring-rule markets reward precise thesis expression over simple directional bets.
Investigates combinatorial prediction markets, which extend the standard model to support forecasts on conditional events (e.g., A given B) and Boolean combinations of events rather than only base events. Reports experimental results comparing combinatorial versus flat market structures on forecasting accuracy and calibration. Co-authored by Robin Hanson, whose LMSR underpins most automated prediction markets.